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We then estimate the implied monetary gains from EU membership. As a test of the theory,
we show that the model can account for the breakup of Yugoslavia and the dynamics of its
disintegration. We find that economic differences between the Yugoslav republics determined
the order of disintegration, but cultural differences, though small, were key to the country’s
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proxy for cultural heterogeneity.
Keywords Nation formation · Genetic diversity · Cultural heterogeneity · Secession ·
Unification · Europe · Yugoslavia
JEL Classification H77 · D70 · F02 · H40
K. Desmet · I. Ortuño-Ortín
Universidad Carlos III, Getafe, Madrid, Spain
K. Desmet · S. Weber
CEPR, London, UK
M. Le Breton
Toulouse School of Economics, Toulouse, France
S. Weber (B)
Southern Methodist University, Dallas, TX, USA
S. Weber
New Economic School, Moscow, Russia
123
184 J Econ Growth (2011) 16:183–213
1 Introduction
Recent decades have witnessed large-scale map redrawing. Some countries, such as the Soviet
Union and Yugoslavia, have broken up, while others have moved towards closer coopera-
tion, as epitomized by the European Union, and to a lesser extent, ASEAN. Theory suggests
that the size of a nation is determined by the trade-off between scale economies that benefit
larger nations and the costs of population heterogeneity that favor smaller countries (see,
e.g., Alesina and Spolaore 1997, 2003; Bolton and Roland 1997). Although there is some
reduced-form evidence supportive of this tradeoff,1 an empirical and quantitative exploration
of its plausibility within a structural model has so far been lacking. Our paper addresses this
shortcoming by proposing a theoretical model, calibrating it to the European experience,
and analyzing its predictions for the breakup of Yugoslavia and for other ‘weak links’ in the
European map.
In our theoretical model with multiple regions and countries, agents in every country vote
on the optimal level of public spending, taking into account increasing returns in the provision
of public goods. However, the utility derived from public goods is decreasing in the country’s
degree of cultural heterogeneity. Assuming that the tax rate in every country is chosen by
majority voting, we compare a region’s welfare across different political arrangements. This
allows us to study whether regions or countries would like to unite or secede. We use two
alternative stability concepts: one requires that any rearrangement should have the support
of the majority in each affected region, while another allows for unilateral secessions.
Since the main goal of the paper is to empirically explore the stability of countries, the
most crucial issue in linking our model to the data is the empirical measurement of cultural
heterogeneity. We accept the view that the degree of mixing between two populations over
the course of history is positively correlated with the similarity of their cultural values. Since
populations that have experienced more mixing—or populations that have become separated
more recently—are closer genetically, there should be a positive correlation between genetic
and cultural distances. We therefore use genetic distances amongst populations as a proxy
for cultural distances.2 It is important to clarify that we view genetic distances as a record of
mixing, and not as an indicator of the link between genes and human behavior.
To assess the empirical plausibility of the theory, we calibrate our model to the current
European situation. In particular, we determine the parameter values that are consistent with
the European map being stable. We then ask the following questions:3 What are the weak
links in that map? Which regions are more likely to secede? Which countries stand a better
chance to cooperate and possibly unite? To answer these questions, we start by increasing
the cost associated with cultural heterogeneity, and check which region would be the first to
secede. We find that the Basque Country and Scotland are the most likely regions to break
away. Consistent with this finding, these are the only two regions in Western Europe where
local governments have called for referendums on self-determination. Likewise, by decreas-
ing the perceived cost of cultural heterogeneity, we determine which countries are most likely
to unite. When focusing on neighboring countries, Austria and Switzerland top the list of 231
1 Alesina et al. (2000) uncover a positive relation between the number of countries and the degree of trade
openness; Alesina and Wacziarg (1998) find that smaller countries are more open; Sorens (2005) finds that
larger richer regions with a different language are more likely to support secessionist movements; and Sambanis
(2006) provides a descriptive overview of this literature.
2 For applications of genetic data in economics, see Spolaore and Wacziarg (2009), who use genetic distance
between populations to study the diffusion of economic development, and Ashraf and Galor (2008), who study
the relation between development and genetic diversity within populations.
3 Although we focus on Europe, this setup could easily be applied to other parts of the world.
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possible pairs, followed by Denmark–Norway, France–Britain, France–Italy, and Belgium–
Netherlands. These results suggest that unification is more likely when countries have similar
population sizes, similar levels of GDP per capita, and similar cultures. Note that two out of
these five pairs (Denmark–Norway and Belgium–Netherlands) were actually united for parts
of their history. As a first application of the theory we then explore the gains (and losses)
from European Union membership. Focusing on the EU-15, we find that the monetary gains
as a share of GDP go from 0% in the case of Germany to 13% in the case of Portugal. All
else equal, richer countries gain less than poorer countries (Sweden gains less than Portugal),
and cultural distances also reduce gains (Greece gains less than Portugal, in spite of being
poorer).
As a more direct test of our theory we analyze whether our calibrated model is able to
account for the breakup of Yugoslavia. We start by determining whether the theory predicts
that any of the six Yugoslav republics wants to unilaterally break away from the rest of
Yugoslavia. If at least one republic prefers to leave the union, we conclude that Yugoslavia
is unstable. We then go one step further and study the dynamic process of disintegration. We
assume that the republic that gains most from secession breaks away first. Once that republic
has left, we recompute the incentives for secession for the remaining republics, given that
they are now part of a diminished Yugoslavia. The next republic to go is then the one who
gains most from leaving whatever is left over of Yugoslavia. This process continues until
either the whole country has disintegrated or no republic experiences gains from secession.
We find that Yugoslavia was less stable than the rest of Europe. In particular, using param-
eter values for which, say, the Basque Country and Scotland, have no incentive to secede,
Slovenia and Croatia did prefer to leave Yugoslavia. Overall, the model accounts well for the
order of disintegration: Slovenia and Croatia secede first, followed possibly by Bosnia and
Macedonia, whereas Montenegro prefers to stay in the union. These predictions are broadly
consistent with historical events. After the dissolution of the all-Yugoslav Communist Party in
1990 Slovenia and Croatia were the only two republics pushing for more devolution, and they
both declared independence on the same day, June 25, 1991. Macedonia and Bosnia followed
close behind, and by 1992 only the union between Montenegro and Serbia was left. Although
Montenegro eventually also declared independence from Serbia, this happened 15 years later,
in 2006, after a small majority voted in favor of self-determination. Another relevant question
in the context of Yugoslavia is what was the relative importance of culture and economics
in the country’s disintegration. Although cultural distances between the different Yugoslav
republics were not particularly large, we find that economic differences alone were not big
enough to pull the country apart. If Yugoslavia had been culturally homogenous, the model
predicts the country would have stayed together. That being said, the order of disintegration
is largely driven by economics. The first two republics to leave, Slovenia and Croatia, were,
respectively, the richest republic and the largest republic, whereas the republic that never
wants to leave according to the model, Montenegro, is very small, with a population of just
over half a million.
The ability of the model to account for the breakup of Yugoslavia and to closely match the
order of its disintegration lends credibility to our theory. It also provides a new tool for the
analysis of the stability of nations. In the last couple of years there has been much talk about
the viability of countries such as Iraq and Bolivia to survive as unified states. Although these
questions are difficult and complex, and answering them requires in-depth knowledge that
goes beyond the simplicity of our framework, our paper shows that having a structural model
that can make quantitative predictions can shed light on these important policy questions.
Given the importance of cultural heterogeneity in our framework, we now turn to dis-
cussing some theoretical and empirical issues related to this notion. To model cultural
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heterogeneity, we rely on a matrix of cultural distances between nations. We refer to this
measure as metric heterogeneity. Preferences are such that, all else equal, an agent prefers
to be part of a nation which minimizes cultural distances. In other words, each agent ranks
nations on the basis of how culturally heterogeneous they are. The notion of metric heteroge-
neity we employ is similar to the one described in the literature on cooperative games where
players are characterized by their location in a network or in a geographical space. In such a
framework the gains from cooperation increase when the distances among the players in the
coalition decrease.4
Instead of relying on genetic distances as a proxy for cultural distances, an alternative
would be to use data from social surveys on individuals’ values. However, the answers to
many questions in opinion polls are arguably biased by short term events, such as the polit-
ical business cycle. Since we are interested in long-term decisions—secessions or unifica-
tions—information gathered from surveys or opinion polls may not be the most appropriate.
Nevertheless, we do explore this type of information, and find a strong correlation between
distances based on social surveys and genetic distances. We view this result not as an argument
for an extensive use of opinion polls, but rather as lending support to the view that genetic
distances are a reasonable proxy for cultural distances. In addition to genetic distances or
social surveys, geographical or linguistic distances may capture the same type of information
(see, e.g., Fearon 2003). Indeed, the relation between genes, languages and geography has
been extensively studied in population genetics (see, e.g., Sokal 1987; Cavalli-Sforza et al.
1994). However, even after controlling for languages and geography, we find that populations
that are similar in genes tend to give more similar answers to opinion polls.5
Needless to say, our main assumption—more population mixing implies smaller cultural
differences—is open to debate. Some authors claim that mixing is not necessary for cultural
diffusion to happen (see, e.g., Jobling et al. 2004). It might be the case that, say, Danes have
not mixed much with Germans in the last 30 generations, so that there genetic distance is
relatively large. However, cultural diffusion might have taken place through books, newspa-
pers, the education system, religion, etc., making their preferences quite similar. The question
of whether the transmission of culture takes place through migration flows and the mixing
of populations (demic diffusion) has generated yet another debate in population genetics.
Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) and Chikhi et al. (2002) have argued for the dominant role played
by demic diffusion. Their view has been supported by Spolaore and Wacziarg (2005) in
their study of the diffusion of innovation, whereas Haak et al. (2005) offer an opposite view
regarding the diffusion of farming in Europe.6
Since we use information of many different genes, the use of genetic distances requires
our theory to embed those distances in a multi-dimensional space. Thus, in contrast to much
of the existing theoretical work, population heterogeneity in our model is multi-dimensional.
Although there may be certain policy issues for which a one-dimensional space suffices,7
in general this is too restrictive. For example, if agents who reside in the same county
have to decide on the geographic location of a public facility, this problem is, by nature,
4 Le Breton and Weber (1995) focus on the case where two-person coalitions may form and characterize the
patterns for which there is a stable group structure. In contrast to their work, we do not allow for unlimited
monetary lump sum transfers among players in the group.
5 A paper by Giuliano et al. (2006) argues that in the case of trade genetic distances cease to be significant
once geographical distances are properly measured. In contrast, our focus is on cultural distances, not on trade.
6 See also Ashraf and Galor (2007) on the effect of cultural diffusion on technological innovation.
7 See, e.g., Alesina and Spolaore (1997).
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two-dimensional. Also, agents with the same income may have different views regarding the
desired level of redistribution within society. Thus, the search for an optimal public policy is
naturally a multi-dimensional problem.
Other relevant work, though not in the context of the trade-off between scale economies and
cultural heterogeneity, includes the landscape theory of Axelrod and Bennett (1993), aimed
at predicting the European alignment during the Second World War. They consider a two-bloc
setting where each nation is characterized by its propensity to work with other nations. Given
the partition of all nations into two blocs, the frustration of a nation is determined as the sum
of its propensities towards nations outside the bloc it belongs, and energy is then the weighted
sum of the frustrations of all countries. Using the 1936 data, Axelrod and Bennett show that
a local energy minimum over two-bloc structures almost exactly corresponds to the wartime
alignment in Europe. A major drawback of their work is the absence of economic forces.
Other related work is Spolaore and Wacziarg (2005) who estimate the effect of political bor-
ders on economic growth and run a number of counterfactual experiments to examine how
the union of different countries would affect growth. However, they do not take into account
cultural heterogeneity. Also of interest is a recent paper of Alesina et al. (2010) that explores
the poor economic performance of “artificial” states, where borders do not match a division of
nationalities.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the theoretical frame-
work. Section 3 provides empirical support for using genetic distances as a proxy of cultural
heterogeneity. Section 4 calibrates the model to Europe, explores the likelihood of seces-
sions and unions, and analyzes the gains from EU membership. Section 5 tests the theory by
analyzing whether the model can account for the breakup of Yugoslavia and the order of its
disintegration. Section 6 concludes.
2 The model
In this section we describe the structure of the model. The world is made up of agents,
regions and countries. Agents reside in regions and are geographically immobile. Different
agents are endowed with different levels of income. The set of regions is exogenously given.
Regions are culturally homogeneous. Countries consist of one or more regions. Cultural
differences across regions imply that multi-region countries are culturally heterogeneous.
The partition of the set of regions into countries can change, and our goal is to analyze
the stability of partitions. Agents derive utility from the consumption of a private good and
a public good, which is financed through a country-wide proportional tax rate. The utility
derived from the public good is decreasing in the degree of cultural heterogeneity. Tax rates
are decided by majority vote at the country level. If a change in partition affects the coun-
try a region belongs to, the utility of an agent in that region changes, because the tax rate,
the level of the public good, and the degree of cultural heterogeneity change. By imposing
intermediate preferences, the median income agent in each region represents the majority
of its residents, in spite of the multi-dimensionality problem. We consider two different sta-
bility concepts to assess the possibility of map redrawing. One requires the consent of all
affected regions, whereas the other allows for unilateral secession. In what follows we pres-
ent the model’s setup, discuss the preferences over different partitions, define the stability
concepts, and end by presenting the specific functional forms we will use in the empirical
section.
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2.1 Setup
The world is partitioned into countries, indexed by C , each consisting of one or several
regions, indexed by I or J . The set of regions, denoted by N , is exogenously given, whereas
the partition of regions into countries can change. Denote by  the set of possible partitions
of regions into countries, and by π an element of that set. Regions are populated by agents,
who are geographically immobile. The population of country C is then
p(C) =
∑
I∈C
p(I ),
where p(I ) is the population of region I . The summation extends over all regions that belong
to C .
There are two types of heterogeneity, cultural and income. Within each region, there
is income heterogeneity, but no cultural heterogeneity. That is, residents of a same region
may have different incomes, but are culturally identical. In countries that consist of multiple
regions both types of heterogeneity, cultural and income, are present. That is, residents of
different regions, in addition to possibly having different incomes, may be culturally different.
For any two regions I, J ∈ N , we call d(I, J ) the cultural distance between a resident
of I and a resident of J .8 Obviously, d(I, J ) = d(J, I ) for all I and J , and d(I, I ) = 0
for all I . The cultural heterogeneity experienced by a resident of region I ∈ C , denoted by
H(I, C), is the weighted cultural distance between that resident and all other residents of
C . This corresponds to the expected cultural distance between an agent from region I and a
randomly drawn agent from country C . Hence,
H(I, C) =
∑
J∈C
p(J )d(I, J )
p(C)
. (1)
Each agent i is endowed with a certain amount of income, yi . The income distribution
in region I is given by the cumulative density function FI (y) with total mass p(I ), whose
support [y, y¯] is common to all regions. We assume that FI (y) is continuous and strictly
increasing. The total income in I is denoted by Y (I ):
Y (I ) =
y¯∫
y
y d FI (y) (2)
Similarly, Y (C) denotes the total income in country C .
The utility of resident i of region I ∈ C , u(x, g, H(I, C)), depends on private consump-
tion, x , the level of the public good in his country, g, and the degree of cultural heterogeneity
he faces, H(I, C):
u(x, g, H(I, C)) (3)
The utility function u is twice continuously differentiable, strictly concave and increasing in
x and g. For simplicity, the prices of the private good and the public good are both set to 1.
Cultural heterogeneity reduces the utility, so that u is decreasing in its last argument,
H(I, C). Alesina et al. (2004) offer two reasons for this homogeneity bias, reflecting the
preference of agents for more culturally homogeneous communities. One is that individuals
8 In the empirical part of our investigation we identify d(I, J ) with the genetic distance between regions I
and J .
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who share a common background may have similar preferences over public goods. Another
is that, even if individuals have similar preferences to those in other groups, they may still
prefer to interact with members of their own group. The specific functional form we will use
in the empirical section will assume that cultural heterogeneity enters negatively by reducing
the utility an agent derives from the consumption of the public good.
Public goods are specific to each country, and are financed through a proportional tax
rate τ, 0 ≤ τ ≤ 1, chosen by majority voting. As is obvious, this implies redistribution.9 If
country C selects tax rate τ , the level of the public good will be τY (C). The indirect utility
v of resident i of region I ∈ C , with income yi and paying a tax rate τ , can be written as
v(yi , τ, I, C) = u(yi (1 − τ), τY (C), H(I, C)). (4)
Note that for every country C the preferences of every agent i ∈ C over tax rates are
single-peaked. Denote by τ(yi , I, C) the preferred tax rate for an individual i with income
yi who resides in region I ∈ C . Hence,
τ(yi , I, C) = arg max
τ∈[0,1] v(yi , τ, I, C). (5)
2.2 Preferences over partitions
If a region changes the country it belongs to, residents in that region will face a different
degree of cultural heterogeneity, a different tax rate, and a different level of public good.10
An agent residing in region I , faced with the choice of I belonging to C or C ′, prefers the
first alternative if
v(yi , τ (C), I, C) > v(yi , τ (C ′), I, C ′)
where τ(C) is the tax rate chosen by majority voting at the country-level.11 This implies that
an agent understands that the resulting tax rate depends on the country his region belongs to.
Since changing the country a region belongs to affects the tax rates, public goods, and
cultural heterogeneity, it is not immediately obvious who will be a region’s decisive agent. We
assume that agents have intermediate preferences of Grandmont (1978). This assumption,
satisfied by a large class of functions,12 solves the multi-dimensionality issue, as it implies
that the preferences of a region’s median income agent represent those of the majority of its
residents. That is, if the median income agent of region I prefers to be part of country C ,
rather than of C ′, then a majority of agents in region I also prefer to be part of country C .13
This is referred to as the decisiveness of the median agent (Gans and Smart 1996).
Median decisiveness will facilitate our analysis of the stability of a partition, as it allows
us to only focus on the preferences of the median income agents of the different regions. It
is important to point out that in our framework the benefit of a region from being part of a
certain country depends solely on the composition of that country and not on the number
9 Consistent with the empirical literature, the degree of redistribution will be decreasing in the level of cultural
heterogeneity. We return to this point in Sect. 2.4.
10 The level of the public good depends both on the tax rate and the total income of the country.
11 Since preferences over τ are single-peaked, this τ(C) is well defined.
12 See, e.g., Greenberg and Weber (1986) and Demange (1994). In particular, it contains the functional forms
considered in Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and Alesina et al. (1999, 2004), where the degree of heterogeneity
is represented by the type or location of the public good. In fact, it also contains the utility functions of the
type u(x, g, I, C) = xδ + (g, H(I, C)), where  is an arbitrary continuous function, with 0 < δ ≤ 1. This
includes the case the quasi-linear case with δ equal to 1, considered in our empirical investigation.
13 This result is proven in Proposition 1 of the working paper. See Desmet et al. (2009a).
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and composition of the other countries. This links our model to the theory of hedonic games,
introduced by Drèze and Greenberg (1980), where the payoff of a player depends exclusively
upon the group to which she belongs.14
2.3 Stability
We now turn our attention to the stability of partitions. Several stability concepts have been
applied in the literature.15 We consider two such concepts in our paper. The first one, called
Limited Right of Map Redrawing, requires, subject to majority voting, the approval of any
map redrawing by all affected regions.16 The second concept, called unilateral secession,
is a modification of the core, and it requires only the approval, by majority voting, of the
seceding region.17
2.3.1 LRMR-stability
The Limited Right of Map Redrawing stability concept, denoted LRMR-stability, says that
a partition is stable if there is no other partition preferred by a majority of agents in each
region affected by the change in partition. In other words, changing a partition would need
the consent of all affected parties. The Canadian Clarity Act of 2000, which regulates the pos-
sible secession of a Canadian province, is an example. Under this act, secession requires an
amendment to the constitution, thus involving negotiations with the governments of all prov-
inces. We now formalize the LRMR-stability concept, and argue that the set of LRMR-stable
partitions is nonempty.
Definition 1 LRMR-Stability. A partition π ∈  is LRMR-stable if there is no π ′ ∈  for
which the majority of residents of every region affected by the shift from π to π ′ prefers
partition π ′ over π .
Proposition 1 The set of LRMR-stable partitions is nonempty.
The proof is presented in the Appendix.
Recall that  was defined as the set of possible partitions. When empirically analyzing
the stability of a given partition, it may be convenient to restrict the set of possible partitions
to be smaller than the set of all partitions. Indeed, the formation of a country may be limited
by various geographical, political or historical considerations. For example, it is unusual for
countries to consist of geographically disconnected regions. Previous violent conflicts or
wars may also prevent the co-existence of certain regions within the same country. Some
of these restrictions, which are exogenous to the model, will play a role in the empirical
analysis.
14 However, our game is not “additively separable” which rules out the direct application of the results by
Banerjee et al. (2001) and Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002). Also, the contribution by Milchtaich and Winter
(2002), where players compare groups on the basis of the distance between their own characteristics and the
average characteristics of the group, share some common features with our work.
15 See, e.g., Alesina and Spolaore 1997, Jéhiel and Scotchmer (2001) and Bogomolnaia et al. (2007).
16 This stability concept is referred to as B-stability in Alesina and Spolaore (1997) and equilibrium with
admission by majority vote in Jéhiel and Scotchmer (2001). If the majority requirement were to be replaced
by unanimous consent, this stability concept would be reminiscent of contractual individual stability, studied
by Greenberg (1977), Drèze and Greenberg (1980), and Bogomolnaia and Jackson (2002).
17 This resembles C-stability in Alesina and Spolaore (1997).
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2.3.2 ULS-stability
LRMR-stability assumes that no map redrawing can take place without the consent of all
affected regions. However, in some countries or federations there are constitutional provisions
that allow for unilateral secession. For example, Article 39(1) of the Ethiopian constitution
reads “every nation, nationality, and people in Ethiopia has the unconditional right to self-
determination, including the right to secession”. Of course, the absence of constitutional
provisions that regulate exit does not mean unilateral secessions are never attempted, with
or without success. The secession of the Netherlands from Spain in the sixteenth century,
the split up of Norway and Sweden in 1905, the failed secession of the Confederate States
in 1861, and the break-up of Yugoslavia in the last decade of the twentieth century, are just
some examples.
To deal with this possibility, we introduce the unilateral secession stability concept,
denoted ULS-stability, which says that a partition is stable only if no majority in any of
the regions wants to break away. Let C I (π) denote the country in π that contains region I .
Definition 2 ULS-Stability. A partition π ∈  is ULS-stable if there is no region I for
which the majority of its residents prefers I to be a separate country instead of I being a part
of country C I (π).
It is trivial to see that the set of ULS-stable partitions is non-empty. Indeed, a partition
that consists of each region being a separate country is always ULS-stable. Therefore,
Proposition 2 The set of ULS-stable partitions is nonempty.
As in the case of LRMR-stability, in our empirical applications we may wish to restrict
the set of possible partitions  to take into account certain limitations that have not been
explicitly modeled. For example, the core region of a country, in its capacity of hegemon,
may perceive additional benefits from keeping the country together, thus preventing it from
wanting to leave the union.
2.4 Our specification
To bring our theoretical model to the data, we adopt the following quasi-linear functional
form for the utility of a resident of region I ∈ C :
u(x, g, I, C) = x + α(Z(I, C) g)β, (6)
where α > 0 and β > 0 are exogenously given parameters, and Z(I, C) is a ‘discount factor’,
whose range is between 0 and 1. This utility function satisfies the intermediate preferences
assumption.
Since cultural heterogeneity reduces the utility an agent derives from the consumption
of the public good g, we assume that the value of Z(I, C) is negatively correlated with the
cultural heterogeneity faced by a resident of region I in country C :
Z(I, C) = 1 − H(I, C)δ, (7)
where δ ∈ [0, 1]. The parameter δ is important in two respects. First, since H(I, C) is
between 0 and 1, the smaller is δ, the greater is the cost of heterogeneity. If δ is very small,
the value of Z(I, C) in a multi-regional country is close to zero. In other words, a small δ
implies that in such a country any amount of public consumption becomes almost useless.
Second, the smaller is δ, the more convex is the discount factor Z . For small values of δ, the
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discount factor exhibits a high degree of convexity, so that the relative effect of increasing
heterogeneity on Z is larger at lower levels of heterogeneity.
The indirect utility of an individual i with income yi , residing in region I ∈ C , where the
tax rate is τ , is
v(yi , τ, I, C) = yi (1 − τ) + α (Z(I, C) τ Y (C))β . (8)
We can now explicitly derive τ(yi , I, C), the preferred tax rate for an individual i with income
yi who resides in region I ∈ C :
τ(yi , I, C) =
(
yi
α β (Z(I, C)Y (C))β
) 1
β−1
(9)
As can be seen, the optimal tax rate is decreasing in the level of cultural heterogeneity,
Z(I, C).18
Notice that, in general, for I, J ∈ C we have Z(I, C) = Z(J, C). In other words, the cost
of cultural heterogeneity tends to be different for agents living in different regions of the same
country. As a result, two individuals with the same income level, but residing in different
regions of country C , typically have different preferred tax rates. This implies that the median
agent in country C does not necessarily coincide with the agent with the median income in
C . This feature has important consequences for the empirical part of the paper. Finding the
preferred tax rate of a coalition of regions forming a country becomes more laborious than
just finding the preferred tax rate of the median income agent. Of course, when a country is
formed by only one region, this problem disappears, and the agent with the median income
becomes the decisive one.
3 Genetic and cultural distances
In our quantitative analysis we will use genetic distances as a proxy for cultural distances
between populations. In the introduction we argued that genetic distances are the best objec-
tive measure of the intensity of population mixing. Therefore, in as far as cultural diffusion
happens through mixing, genetic distances should be a reliable measure of cultural distances.
To further justify our choice of proxy, we study the correlation between genes and culture
by comparing a matrix of genetic distances to a matrix of “cultural” distances. The genetic
distances come from Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994),19 whereas the cultural distances are based
on the World Values Survey (WVS).
To compute cultural distances from the WVS, we take the 430 questions related to Percep-
tion of Life, Family, and Religion and Moral from the four waves currently available online at
http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/. Each question has q different possible answers and we
18 This is consistent with the findings of La Porta et al. (1999) and Alesina et al. (2003) who provide evidence
of a negative relation between ethnolinguistic diversity and the willingness to redistribute. These papers mea-
sure diversity without taking into account the distance between groups, i.e., how distinct the different groups
are. When including ethnolinguistic distances between groups, the negative relation between diversity and
redistribution is further strengthened (Desmet et al. 2009b). For a survey of this literature, see Ginsburgh and
Weber (2011).
19 See Hartl and Clark (1997) for an introduction to population genetics, and Jorde (1985) and Cavalli-Sforza
et al. (1994) for a discussion on the use of the different types of genetic distances to measure human population
distances. The distances in Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) are based on large sample sizes and use information
about many different genes. Most of the frequencies used to obtain those distances come from allozymes,
instead of from direct ‘observation’ of the DNA sequence, a technique which is now available. However,
Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (2003) argue that these new techniques and data do not change the basic results.
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Fig. 1 Genetic distances and World Value Survey distances
denote by ai, j = (a1i, j , a2i, j , . . . , aqi, j ) the vector of relative answers to question i in nation j .
For example, suppose that question i has three possible answers, a1, a2 and a3. The vector
ai, j = (1/2, 0, 1/2) indicates that in nation j , half of the people answers a1 and the other half
a3. We construct a matrix of cultural distances between nations such that the ( j, k) element
of the matrix represents the average Manhattan distance between nation j and nation k:
wjk = 1430
430∑
i=1
q∑
s=1
∣∣∣xsi, j − xsi,k
∣∣∣ (10)
All our results are robust to the usage of the Euclidean distance instead of the Manhattan
distance in (10).
Both distance matrices are reported in the Appendix. Table 8 gives the matrix of genetic
distances, denoted by D, and Table 9 gives the matrix of cultural distances, denoted by
W . Although matrix D covers more countries, and also some regions within countries, the
comparison between both matrices is done on the basis of 14 European countries.
As a first step to verify whether genetically close countries provide similar answers to the
questions in the World Value Survey, Fig. 1 shows a scatter plot representing genetic distances
on the horizontal axis and WVS distances on the vertical axis. Each point in the scatter plot
corresponds to a nation pair (i, j), where the x-coordinate is the genetic distance between i
and j , and the y-coordinate is the WVS distance between i and j . Figure 1 suggests a strong
positive relation between genetic and cultural distances.
We now compute the correlation between both matrices, and assess its statistical signif-
icance. Due to the triangle inequality property, the elements of a distance matrix are not
independent, so that we cannot use standard methods to determine the statistical significance
of the observed correlation between matrices D and W . To address this issue, we rely on the
Mantel test, a nonparametric randomization procedure often used in Population Genetics.20
The significance of the correlation is evaluated via the random permutation of rows and
20 See Mantel (1967), Sokal and Rohlf (1995), and Legendre and Legendre (1998). For the use of the Mantel
test in economics, see Collado et al. (2005).
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columns of one of the matrices. For each random permutation, the correlation r between the
two matrices is re-computed. After a sufficient number of permutations, the distribution of
values of r is generated, and the critical value of the test at the chosen level of significance
is determined.
The correlation coefficient between matrices D and W is 0.56 and the hypothesis of non-
positive correlation is strongly rejected based on a Mantel test with 100,000 replications
(p value of 0.000). This highly significant correlation provides the foundation for our use
of the matrix of genetic distances as a proxy for the cultural heterogeneity among European
countries. This correlation is robust to the different subgroups of questions in the World Value
Survey we consider. Computing the corresponding the correlations with Perceptions of Life
(307 questions), Family (77 questions) and Religion and Moral (165 questions) yield 0.45,
0.67 and 0.68.
If the justification for using matrix D is based on its correlation with the matrix W , one
might argue that it would be better to directly use W for our analysis. However, the matrix
W is based on opinion polls, and although we focus on questions related to people’s long
term preferences, their answers may still be distorted by short term events. In that sense, we
are interested in analyzing the correlation between W and D, not because W is an unbiased
measure of the true cultural distances, but because a lack of positive correlation would raise
doubts about using D as a proxy for those unknown cultural distances.
Of course there may be other proxies for cultural distances apart from genetic distances.
Two alternatives come to mind: geographic distances and linguistic distances. To explore
this possibility, we compute a matrix of geographic distances, G, and a matrix of linguistic
distances, L , between European countries.21 The correlation between geographic distances
(G) and cultural distances (W ) is 0.52 (p value of 0.000) and the correlation between lin-
guistic distances (L) and cultural distances (W ) is 0.42 (p value of 0.000). Not surprisingly,
these correlations are also positive and statistically significant. In fact, as has been argued
by Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1988), there is a strong link between genetic distances, geographic
distances and linguistic distances. Subsequent studies, such as the one by Belle and Barbujani
(2007), have tended to confirm this view.
To determine which distance measure is a more convincing proxy of cultural distances, we
compute several partial correlations. We start by determining the significance of the partial
correlation between genetic distances (D) and cultural distances (W ), after controlling for
geographic distances (G) and linguistic distances (L). This is done by using a partial Mantel
test, which consists of constructing a matrix of residuals, D′, of the regression of D on G
and L , and a matrix of residuals, W ′, of the regression of W on G and L , and then comparing
D′ and W ′ using a standard Mantel test.22 The correlation between D′ and W ′ is 0.28, still
significantly greater than zero (p value of 0.04). To understand what this means, consider
the following example. Say country i is geographically equidistant from j and k, and the
same language is spoken in j and k. In that case country i will be closer to country j than to
country k in the answers given to the WVS if the genetic distance between i and j is smaller
than between i and k. We now assess the significance of the partial correlation between
geographic (G) and cultural distances (W ), after controlling for genetic (D) and linguistic
distances (L). We find a partial correlation of 0.20. Though positive, it is not statistically
21 Geographic distances were calculated “as the crow flies”, and the coordinates of each region were obtained
from Simoni et al. (2000). Linguistic distances between countries are computed using data on the linguistic
composition of each country from the Ethnologue project and data on the distance between Indo-European lan-
guages from Dyen et al. (1992). For the use of linguistic distances in economics, see Fearon (2003), Ginsburgh
et al. (2005) and Desmet et al. (2009b).
22 See Smouse et al. (1986).
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significant (p value of 0.105). A similar exercise for the partial correlation between linguistic
(L) and cultural distances (W ), after controlling for genetic (D) and geographic distances
(G), gives a partial correlation of 0.11 with a p value of 0.185.
In other words, when controlling for the other two distances, only the partial correlation
between genetic distances and cultural distances continues to be positive and statistically
significant at the 5% level. Although linguistic and geographic distances are also reasonable
proxies for cultural distances between populations, this result provides an argument in favor
of using genetic distances.
4 Stability of Europe
In this section we use information on cultural distances between European regions and coun-
tries to estimate values of α, β and δ that yield an LRMR-stable partition of Europe. This
exercise is of interest in itself, since as a way of validating our theoretical framework, it seems
important that the set of parameter values consistent with stability is not empty. Once we
have calibrated the parameter values to the stability of Europe, we explore the ‘weak links’
in the current map of Europe by analyzing which regions have a higher propensity to secede
and which country pairs have a higher propensity to unite. This exercise aims to illustrate the
basic forces at work in the theoretical model. As a first real application of the theory, we then
analyze the gains (and losses) from European Union membership. A second application, on
the breakup of Yugoslavia, will be discussed in Sect. 5.
4.1 Data
We rely on genetic distances to proxy for cultural distances. To find parameter values that
render the European map stable, it is important to have information, not just on countries,
but also on regions. Indeed, to limit the range of δ from above and from below, it is not
enough to make sure that no existing countries want to unite, we must also guarantee that no
existing regions want to separate. The matrix of Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994), reproduced in
Table 8 in the Appendix, is therefore appropriate, as it contains information on 22 European
countries and 4 European regions (Basque Country, Sardinia, Scotland and Lapland).23,24
Although it leaves out a number of relevant regions (Flanders, Catalonia, Brittany, North-
ern Italy, Corsica, etc.), it does include the only two regions in Europe (Scotland and the
Basque Country) where in recent years local governments have called for referendums on
self-determination.25 Given that we have data on two of the regions with most popular
23 Given the small population of Lapland, less than 100,000 and spread over three countries, we do not use
this region in our subsequent analysis. We also drop Yugoslavia, as that country disintegrated in the 1990s.
24 Genetic distances in Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) are between populations rather than between nations.
However, in the case of Europe most of the ethnic groups defined by Cavalli-Sforza coincide with the corre-
sponding nations. For example, what Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) call “French” coincides with the population
of France, and includes different regional groups, such as Bretons or Flemish.
25 In Scotland, the SNP has committed to holding an independence referendum, whereas in the Basque
Country the regional government’s Plan Ibarretxe that called for a referendum in 2008 got overturned in
Spanish courts. In terms of popular support, according to an ICM poll conducted for The Sunday Telegraph
in 2006, Scottish independence is not only backed by 52% of Scots, but by an even higher 59% of English
voters (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/main.jhtml?xml=/news/2006/11/26/nunion26.xml). Note, however,
that when polls give three options, including greater devolution, instead of outright independence, the support
for independence tends to drop to about 20–30%. In the case of the Basque Country, a poll by the Spanish
Centro de Investigaciones Sociologicas in 2005 found 35.3% of Basques in favor of independence and 39.4%
against.
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support for greater devolution, and even outright independence, this should allow us to esti-
mate a reasonable lower bound on δ.
The other data we need are standard. Data on population and GDP per capita (measured in
PPP) are for the year 2000, and come from Eurostat, the Penn World Tables and the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund. Data on income distribution come from the World Income Inequality
Database v.2.0a, collected by the United Nations University. Since those data are not avail-
able for all years, we take the year which is closest to 2000. The income distributions of
regions are taken to be the same as those of the countries they belong to.
For those countries for which we have information on regions, we need to distinguish in
the data between the country, the region, and the country net of the region. Take the case
of Spain. If the question is whether the Basque Country wants to separate, the two relevant
decision makers are the Basque Country and the rest of the Spain. However, if the question
is whether Spain wants to unite with Portugal, the two relevant decision makers are Spain
(including the Basque Country) and Portugal.
4.2 Estimation strategy
Our strategy is to first calibrate α and β using data on a set of European and OECD countries,
so that we are left with only one degree of freedom, the parameter δ. Because we have no
comprehensive data on genetic distances between regions within countries, our approach is
to estimate α and β abstracting from within-country cultural heterogeneity. For this approach
to be reasonable, we focus on a set of countries that are culturally relatively homogeneous.
For want of data on genetic diversity, we use information on linguistic diversity to define such
a set. Based on the ranking of linguistic diversity by Desmet et al. (2009b), we only include
countries in the bottom one third of that ranking, and take those countries to be culturally
homogeneous for our estimation procedure.
The tax rate adopted by a culturally homogeneous country C is
τ(C) =
(
ym(C)
α β (Y (C))β
) 1
β−1
(11)
where ym(C) is the median income in C . To estimate α and β, we thus need data on the tax
rate, τ(C), the median income, ym(C), and the total income, Y (C). For the tax rate, we take
the ratio of government spending on public goods to total GDP. As a measure of public goods
we take ‘general public services’ from the Government Finance Statistics (GFS) database,
collected by the IMF. We use data for those European and OECD countries in the GFS data-
base that are in the bottom one third of countries in terms of linguistic diversity. This gives
us information on a total of 15 countries.
We estimate (11) by applying nonlinear least squares. The results are reported in Table 1.
In addition to focusing on the sample of 15 culturally homogeneous countries, for the purpose
of subsequent robustness checks we consider a number of other alternatives to estimate α and
β. First, we re-estimate the parameter values on the entire sample of European and OECD
countries. Although this doubles the sample size, it comes at the cost of including countries
that are culturally relatively heterogeneous. Second, rather than considering all countries to
be culturally homogeneous, we re-estimate the parameter values assuming that all countries
have a common (positive) degree of cultural heterogeneity. In particular, we set the cultural
discount factor, Z(I, C), equal to 0.3 for all countries. Recall that Z(I, C) has a value between
0 and 1, with lower values indicating higher degrees of cultural heterogeneity. The resulting
estimates of α and β for these alternative approaches are also reported in Table 1.
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Table 1 Estimation of α and β
α β
Only linguistically homogeneous countries 22.05 0.095
All countries 25.80 0.0833
All countries (Z(I, C) = 0.3) 51.05 0.052
Now that we have estimates for α and β, we compute the range of δ that guarantees the
stability of the current map of Europe. We restrict our analysis to the set of partitions which
contain the current map, all possible secessions (Basque Country–Spain, Scotland–Britain,
Sardinia–Italy), and all possible mergers between country pairs. In other words, we do not
consider all partitions. For example, we do not allow for unions between more than two
countries, or for regions switching allegiances from one country to another. In as far as larger
unions start off small, and in as far as a region must first secede before joining another coun-
try, our restricted set of partitions seems reasonable. In any case, in Sect. 4.5 we will return
to the issue of unions between more than two countries.
To determine the range of δ that ensures LRMR-stability, we start by analyzing the con-
dition for no region to secede. Consider the three regions in our database (Basque Country,
Sardinia, and Scotland) and the three countries they belong to (Spain, Italy, and Britain). For
secession to occur, there needs to be a majority in both the seceding region and in the rest
of the country. For instance, if the Basque Country is to separate, a majority of Basques and
a majority of the population in the rest of Spain should approve.26 This implies that for the
Basque Country and the rest of Spain to remain united, it is enough that one of the two parties
prefers to maintain the union.
Formally, suppose region I is part of country C . Let vm(I, C) be the value of the indirect
utility of the median income agent in I when the tax rate in C is given by τ(C). The median
income agent in region I prefers to stay within the union than to secede if
vm(I, C) = v(ym(I ), τ (C), I, C) ≥ v(ym(I ), τ (I ), I, I ) = vm(I, I ).
Recall that the higher is δ, the smaller is the cost of heterogeneity, and thus the stronger the
preference to remain united. The net gain of the union for the median agent of region I can
thus be written as an (increasing) function of δ,
gI,C (δ) ≡ vm(I, C) − vm(I, I ). (12)
A similar condition must hold for the rest of the country. By analogy, for the median income
agent of the rest of the country C/I , the net gain of keeping country C united, rather than
letting region I secede, is
gC/I,C (δ) ≡ vm(C/I, C) − vm(C/I, C/I ) ≥ 0. (13)
As before, this net gain is an increasing function of δ, since a higher value of δ implies
attaching a lower cost to cultural heterogeneity.
In order to prevent secession under LRMR-stability, it suffices that one of the two par-
ties, the potentially breakaway region or the rest of the country, prefers to remain united.
Thus, a first necessary condition for the current European partition to be LRMR-stable is
26 If we had data on more Spanish regions, then LRMR-stability would require a majority in all Spanish
regions. However, our database never has information on more than one region within each country, so that
any possible secession needs the approval of the majority in the seceding region and of the majority in the rest
of the country taken as a whole.
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the existence of a nonempty set of the parameter δ for which at least one of the functions
(12) and (13) is positive for each of the pairs Basque Country–Spain, Sardinia–Italy, and
Scotland–Britain. The set of δ for which secession does not occur can thus be defined as
SR ≡ {δ| max{gI,C (δ), gC/I,C (δ)} ≥ 0, for all I ∈ {Sardinia, Basque Country, Scotland}}
The range of δ for which this condition holds is obtained numerically. In particular, we find
that for any δ ≥ 0.0284, no region will secede from their respective country. The no-seces-
sion condition thus provides a lower bound on the value of δ. This is consistent with the fact
that higher values of δ imply lower costs of cultural heterogeneity.
We now analyze the condition ensuring that no country pairs want to unite. To determine
the preferred tax rate in a possible union between, say, C and C ′, we first need to identify the
median voter. Because the cultural heterogeneity ‘discount factor’ Z is not the same for all
agents, the median voter need not coincide with the median income agent of the union. To
solve this problem, we proceed in the following way. We compute the average income of an
agent in each decile of the income distribution for both countries C and C ′. This, together
with data on population and income, allows us to determine for the union of C and C ′ the
preferred tax rate of each one of these agents. In the case of the union between two countries,
gives us 20 tax rates. Given that preferences over tax rates are single peaked, we can find the
optimal tax rate for the decisive agent. This is done by ordering the 20 tax rates mentioned
above, and taking the one which corresponds to half of the population of the union.
The net gain obtained by the median income agent in country C from joining country C ′
can be written as
gC,C ′(δ) ≡ vm(C, C ∪ C ′) − vm(C, C)
A second necessary condition for the European map to be LRMR-stable is that there is no
country pair for which a majority in both countries wants to unite. Formally, there is no pair
C, C ′, such that gC,C ′(δ) > 0 and gC ′,C (δ) > 0. The set of δ for which no two nations want
to unite is then
SN ≡ {δ| min{gC,C ′(δ), gC ′,C (δ)} ≤ 0, for all C, C ′}.
Numerically, we find that for any δ ≤ 0.147, no two countries want to join. The no-union
condition thus provides an upper bound on δ. If the value of δ surpasses this upper bound, the
importance attached to cultural heterogeneity is no longer sufficient to keep certain country
pairs from uniting.
Combining the conditions for ‘no secession’ and ‘no union’, a necessary and sufficient
condition for LRMR-stability is that
S ≡ SN ∩ SR
is non empty. It is clear that S is an interval on the real line, and we write S ≡ [δ, δ]. From
the numerical values mentioned before, we find that S = [0.0284, 0.147]. A first conclusion
is therefore that the set of parameter values that render Europe stable is non-empty. Using
the two alternative estimates of α and β in Table 1 to determine the interval S gives us nearly
identical results. In what follows we use the lower and upper bounds of the interval S to
identify the ‘weak links’ in the European map. We will then use these calibrated parameter
values to analyze the gains from European Union membership and the breakup of Yugoslavia.
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4.3 Secessions and unions between country pairs
To illustrate the different forces at work in the model, we analyze which European regions
have a higher propensity to secede, and which European country pairs have a higher propen-
sity to unite. Recall that if δ < 0.0284, the weight given to cultural distances in the utility
function becomes large enough, so that we can no longer prevent secessions from occurring.
Therefore, by progressively lowering δ, we can rank regions according to their propensity
of secession. Likewise, if δ > 0.147, the weight put on cultural distances becomes small
enough, so that some currently independent nations would prefer to unite. Thus, by progres-
sively increasing δ, we can rank country pairs according to their propensity to unite. The aim
of this exercise is to gain a better understanding of the model.
For the case of secessions, the model predicts that the Basque Country has the highest
propensity to break away, followed by Scotland and Sardinia. This ranking is unchanged
under a number of robustness checks.27 These results are consistent with the observation that
the Basque Country and Scotland are the only two regions in Western Europe that in recent
years have called for referendums on self-determination.
For the case of unions, Table 2 ranks the propensity of country pairs uniting. Out of the
231 possible unions, the first column reports the top-10 of most likely unions. Austria and
Switzerland head the ranking: both are small, have similar population sizes, and nearly equal
levels of GDP per capita. In addition, they are genetically very close. Many of the other pairs
in the top-10, such as Denmark–Norway, Austria–Belgium, and Belgium–Netherlands, fit
the same pattern. Unions between rich and poor countries are unlikely, since redistribution
would be too high for the rich country’s liking. Unions between large and small countries
are absent from our list too: the economic gains for the large country would be too limited.
However, not all unions are between small countries. Although large countries stand to gain
less from unification than small countries, if they are sufficiently similar, they may still prefer
to join. This is the case of France and Britain, which rank in fourth position. These two coun-
tries have identical population sizes (a difference of 1%), identical levels of GDP per capita
(a difference of 2%), and they are in the 10th percentile of genetically least distant coun-
tries. This last observation is common to all country pairs in the top-10: all are genetically
close, none drops below the 20th percentile of most similar country pairs. Not surprisingly,
many of these country pairs were actually united at some point in history. Norway was a part
of the Danish crown from the Middle Ages until 1814. Belgium and the Netherlands were
united under Burgundy, Habsburg and Spain from 1384 to 1581, and again after the Treaty
of Waterloo, from 1815 to 1830. Sweden and Norway were under the same crown from 1814
to 1905, not counting a brief common spell in the fourteenth century. The Nordic countries
continue to closely cooperate up to the present day in a variety of ways, as does the Benelux.
Although reunification may not be on the political agenda, recent polls show that more than
two thirds of Dutch support a union with the Flemish part of Belgium, whereas about half of
the Flemish want to reunite with the Netherlands.28
If we were to limit ourselves to geographically contiguous regions, some unions, such as
Hungary-Czech Republic and Norway–Sweden would now make it into the top-10, whereas
others, such as Belgium–Sweden would drop out (see last column in Table 2). Counterfactual
exercises can be used to further enhance our understanding of the model. For example, if all
27 In particular, we used the range of δ, based on the alternative estimates of α and β in Table 1, and also
analyzed the results using two alternative definitions of government spending: ‘defense’ or ‘general public
services, defense, public order, environment and economic affairs’.
28 This is based on polls by television station RTL4 and by the newspapers De Standaard and De Morgen in
2007.
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Table 2 Propensity to unite
Benchmark Geographically contiguous
1 Austria–Switzerland Austria–Switzerland
2 Denmark–Norway Denmark–Norway
3 Austria–Belgium France–Britain
4 France–Britain France–Italy
5 Switzerland–Belgium Belgium–Netherlands
6 France–Italy France–Germany
7 Belgium–Netherlands Norway–Sweden
8 Switzerland–Denmark Czech Republic–Hungary
9 Belgium–Sweden Denmark–Sweden
10 Germany–Britain France–Spain
countries had the same population (equal to the average of European countries), then some
country pairs, such as Germany and Switzerland, would become likely candidates for unifi-
cation. Or if all country pairs had the same genetic distances (equal to the average between
European countries), some pairs, such as Belgium–Netherlands, would cease to make it to
the top-10.
4.4 The gains of European Union membership
We now use our model to estimate the gains from being a member of the EU-15. Given that
we are relying on our theoretical framework, we are interpreting the EU to be a full-blown
political union with common taxes and public policies. In that sense, our analysis should not
be viewed as estimating the benefits from EU membership in its current form, but rather as
a counterfactual exercise. Our goal is two-fold. First, we want to see which countries gain
most from being part of the European Union. Second, we want to understand how taking into
account cultural distances affects the ranking of those gains.
The idea is to view the European Union as a new country formed by the merger of previ-
ously independent nations. We focus on the monetary gains (equivalent variation) from being
part of the EU-15. In particular, we compute the relative increase in per capita income, r(C),
that all agents in country C should receive to render its median agent indifferent between
joining the EU (and not receiving the additional income r(C)ym(C)) and remaining outside
the EU (and receiving r(C)ym(C)). The relative increase (decrease) in income is a measure
of the relative monetary gains (losses) from being part of the EU. To determine r(C) for each
nation C we solve the following equation:
ym(C)(1 + r(C))(1 − τ ′(C)) + α(τ ′(C)Y (C)(1 + r(C)))β (14)
= ym(C)(1 − τ(EU )) + α(Z(C,EU )τ (EU )Y (EU ))β
where τ ′(C) is the optimal tax rate for the median income agent of country C , given that
everyone’s income in C is multiplied by (1 + r(C)). In terms of data, we focus on the 14
member states of the EU-15 for which we have information.29
The relative gains of being part of the European Union depends on the value of δ. Assum-
ing the current map of Europe is stable, our previous estimations indicate that δ belongs to the
29 Data on cultural distances are missing for Luxembourg.
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Table 3 Relative monetary gain from being member of EU
Country Monetary Population Cultural GDP per Ranking
gain (%) distance capita (no distance)
Portugal 13.1 10 0.051 80 −1
Greece 11.9 10.6 0.142 73 1
Ireland 8.9 3.8 0.095 126 0
Finland 8 5.1 0.105 113 0
Denmark 7.5 5.3 0.045 126 −1
Belgium 7 10.2 0.027 117 −3
Austria 6.8 8.1 0.043 126 −1
Sweden 6.4 8.87 0.067 119 1
Netherlands 5.7 15.9 0.041 120 −1
Spain 4.1 40.3 0.056 92 5
Britain 1.6 58.6 0.034 112 −1
France 1.5 59 0.032 114 −1
Italy 1.5 56.9 0.042 113 2
Germany 0.3 82 0.031 112 0
set S = [0.0284, 0.147]. Since it is not obvious which value of δ to choose within that range,
we assume that all the elements of S are equally likely. To compute the relative welfare gain
of being a member of the EU, we therefore take the average of r(C) over all the parameters
in S, namely
r(C) ≡
∫
S
r(C, δ)d F (15)
where F is the uniform distribution over the interval S. We take an approximation r̂(C) by
computing
r̂(C) ≡
50∑
i=0
r(C, δ + δ − δ
50
i) (16)
Table 3 reports the ranking of relative monetary gains of the different member states of
the EU-15. According to our computations, Portugal is the country that gains most, followed
by Greece. At the other extreme is Germany, a country that is essentially indifferent about
being a part of the EU-15, gaining a meager 0.3% from membership. Except for Spain, gains
in the larger countries are relatively small, around 1.5% of GDP.
Different variables—population size, GDP per capita, income distribution, and cultural
heterogeneity—affect this ranking. Table 3 seems to suggest a strong correlation between
population size and relative gains. However, population is not the entire explanation. Greece,
Belgium and Portugal, for instance, all have a population size of around 10 million, but Por-
tugal gains more than Greece, and Greece gains more than Belgium. The difference between
Belgium and Portugal can be attributed to GDP per capita. Richer countries are forced to
redistribute more, and may therefore be less interested in uniting. In contrast, the difference
between Greece and Portugal is due to cultural distances: Greece is genetically the most
distant from the average European country, so that, in spite of being poorer than Portugal, it
gains less from EU membership.
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To understand the role of cultural distances, we recompute the gains from being part of
the EU, setting all distances between all countries to zero. The change in the ranking is given
in the last column of Table 3. As expected, Greece now exchanges positions with Portugal.
Another interesting case is Belgium. Being the country which is least distant from the EU
average, it now loses three positions, and now gains less than Sweden. One of the larger coun-
tries, Spain, moves up 5 positions, and now gains more than many of the smaller countries,
such as the Netherlands, Austria, Belgium or Sweden.
4.5 Full stability
In the previous sections we limited the set of feasible partitions to the current partition, all
unions between country pairs, all secessions, and the EU-15. In order to expand this set, one
has to face the constraint of computing capacity. Indeed, the number of all possible partitions
of the 21 countries and the three regions in our database amounts to 445,958,869,294,805,289.
Moreover, determining who is the agent with the median optimal tax rate in each partition
is extremely laborious, because, due to cultural heterogeneity, the decisive agent need not
coincide with the median income agent. This is one reason for why in Sect. 4.3 we limited
our analysis to unions of two countries. The other reason is that in a dynamic framework,
where larger unions between multiple countries start off as smaller unions between a few,
focusing on country pairs is of interest per se.
In this section we address the problem of global stability and consider the set of all pos-
sible partitions. To cut through the computational problem, we introduce two restrictions.
First, instead of looking at all of Europe, we focus on the EU-15, and leave out some of the
peripheral countries, such as Ireland, Finland and Sweden. In the absence of data for Lux-
embourg, this leaves us with 11 countries, and ‘only’ 678,570 possible partitions. Second,
we assume that in each country the level of the public good is chosen to maximize the total
utility of its residents. It is easy to see that maximizing total utility in a nation is equivalent
to maximizing the population-weighted average of the utility of the mean income residents
of the different regions. In that case, the tax rate adopted in country C is the solution to
τ(C) = arg max
τ∈[0,1]
∑
I∈C
p(I )v(y(I ), τ, I, C) (17)
where y(I ) is the mean income in region I . One can easily show that the solution to (17) is
given by
τ(C) =
(
1
α β
∑
I∈C p(I ) (Z(I,C))β
) 1
β−1 1
Y (C)
. (18)
To compute the tax rate (18), we only need information on population, total GDP and cul-
tural distances, without having to identify the median agent for each partition. As a result,
calculating welfare for each of the 678,570 partitions becomes a computationally feasible
task. It is straightforward to adjust the LRMR-stability concept to make the mean income
agent the decisive one. We only need to replace ‘the majority of its residents’ in Definition
1 by the ‘mean income agent’.
We want to emphasize that we adopted this approach with the sole goal of simplify-
ing the problem computationally. From a theoretical point of view, this simplification may
come at a cost. However, from an empirical point of view it turns out that this ‘mean agent’
framework is a good ‘proxy’ of the previous approach. To reach this conclusion, we recalcu-
lated our derivations in Sects. 4.2 and 4.3, using a ‘mean agent’ rather than a ‘median agent’
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framework. Since none of the previous results changed, adopting this simplification does not
seem to come at the cost of losing realism.
We compute total welfare for each of the 678,570 partitions and select the partition that
yields the maximum. The result depends, obviously, on the chosen value of the parameter δ.
We find that, at an accuracy level of 0.00001, there exists a ‘critical’ value of δ∗ = 0.04066,
such that for δ < δ∗ the current partition of Europe maximizes total welfare, and is therefore
LRMR-stable, whereas for δ > δ∗ the union of all countries maximizes total welfare, so
that the EU would be LRMR-stable. In other words, the only two LRMR-stable partitions of
Europe is either full integration or full independence.
This result is subject to two caveats. First, the absence of configurations other than full
union or full disintegration is not a general feature of the model. One can easily generate
examples for subsets of the countries analyzed in this paper for which the efficient partition
implies the union of some, but not all, countries. For example, if we were to focus on Sweden,
Denmark and Greece, then for values of δ ∈ [0.18, 0.21], the LRMR-stable partition con-
sists of the union of only Denmark and Sweden. Second, in our model we do not impose any
restrictions on how unions are formed. Even if a union between all countries is the efficient
outcome, whether a full union is reached or not would obviously depend on the dynamics of
how unions are formed. The literature on whether preferential trade agreements are building
blocks or stumbling blocks to global free trade may be of interest here.
5 Breakup of Yugoslavia
In this section we analyze the dynamics of the breakup of Yugoslavia. Within the framework
of our model, we ask two questions. Was Yugoslavia unstable? And, if so, what does our
model say about the dynamics of its disintegration? Our strategy in answering these questions
is as follows. Using the calibrated parameter values for α, β and δ from Sect. 4, we start by
analyzing whether any (or several) of the Yugoslav republics wants to unilaterally break away
from the rest of Yugoslavia. If at least one republic prefers to leave the union, we conclude
that Yugoslavia is unstable. We then go one step further by studying the dynamic process
of disintegration. We assume that the republic that gains most from secession breaks away
first. Once that republic has left, we recompute the incentives for secession for the remaining
republics, given that they are now part of a diminished Yugoslavia. The next republic to go is
then the one who gains most from leaving whatever is left over of Yugoslavia. This process
continues until either all republics have become separate nations or no republic experiences
further gains from secession in which case the country stops disintegrating.
Of course our goal is to compare the outcome predicted by the model with what happened
in reality. Without going into detail, it is therefore useful to briefly recall the historical time-
line of the breakup. After the dissolution of the all-Yugoslav Communist Party in 1990 and
multi-party elections in the different republics, Slovenia and Croatia pushed for increasing
devolution and independence, while Serbia and Montenegro favored Yugoslav unity. Unable
to reach their objectives within a unified Yugoslavia, on June 25, 1991, Slovenia and Croatia
became the first republics to declare independence. While in Slovenia independence was
obtained without any significant violence, in Croatia war broke out because of opposition
from its Serbian minority. A couple of months later, in September 1991, Macedonia followed
suit, and seceded in a peaceful manner, without any resistance on the part of the Yugoslav
authorities. Half a year later, on April 5, 1992, Bosnia declared independence, after holding
a referendum on self-determination. As a reaction, the Serbian minority in Bosnia seceded
from the newly created state, and the Bosnian war ensued. De facto, Yugoslavia was now
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Table 4 Genetic distances between Yugoslav republics
Croatia Bosnia Serbia Slovenia Macedonia Montenegro
Croatia 0 25.12 35.26 26.68 67.38 23.12
Bosnia 25.12 0 22.08 9.15 18.50 0.00
Serbia 35.26 22.08 0 15.36 82.92 8.50
Slovenia 26.68 9.15 15.36 0 33.12 14.44
Macedonia 67.39 18.50 82.92 33.12 0 0.21
Montenegro 23.13 0.00 8.50 14.44 0.21 0
down to a union between Serbia and Montenegro. During the next decade, the two remaining
republics gradually drifted apart, culminating in Montenegro becoming independent in May
2006, after 55.5% of its voters supported self-determination in a referendum.
5.1 Data
We compute genetic distances between the six Yugoslav republics—Serbia, Montenegro,
Macedonia, Bosnia, Slovenia and Croatia—using allele frequencies of different genes. Given
that for the Yugoslav republics Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) provide information on only a
limited number of genes, we rely on the Allele Frequency Database (ALFRED) at the Yale
Medical School to complement our data.30 As in Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994), we use the FST
measure to compute genetic distances, thus making our distance matrix comparable to the
one we used for European countries in previous sections. Table 4 gives the genetic distances
between the six Yugoslav republics. With the exception of Montenegro, these distances are
based on a reasonable number of genes. In any case, as we argue later, the exact value of these
different distances does not matter as much as the average order of magnitude.31 Abstracting
from Montenegro, the average distance between two republics is 33, similar to the distance
between, say, France and the Netherlands, but larger than the distances between, for example,
Belgium and the Netherlands or Germany and Austria.
For GDP per capita and population we consider two different dates, one before the breakup,
1984, and one after the breakup, 2004. The 1984 data are the last ones published by the Sta-
tistical Yearbook of Yugoslavia (Statisticki Godišnjak Jugoslavije) and the 2004 data are
some of the first published for all ex-Yugoslav republics by Eurostat. The output data for
1984 are based on the alternative socialist concept of gross social product, which does
not include so-called nonproductive services, such as education, public administration and
defense. Although we are only interested in relative output per capita, using gross social
product may introduce some error if the weight of these nonproductive services differ across
republics. To address this issue, it is desirable to complement the social product measure
with a more standard output measure. In our benchmark exercise we will therefore take the
30 Whenever possible, we use genetic data at the level of the republics, rather than at the level of populations,
to compute genetic distances between the republics. In particular, the raw data of Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994)
provide information on the geographic location of the samples.
31 To be precise, leaving out Montenegro, the average number of genes used in computing the genetic distance
between two republics is 12. Although this is substantially less than the average number of genes used by
Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1994) to compute genetic distances between European countries, it is enough to give us
an order of magnitude. In the case of Montenegro, the average number of genes used is only 3, so the order of
magnitude of distances involving Montenegro may be off.
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Table 5 GDP per capita and population (averages 1984–2004)
GDP per capita
(EU25=100)
Population
(’000s)
Croatia 47 4,583
Bosnia 20 4,316
Serbia 24 9,650
Slovenia 88 1,960
Macedonia 19 2,111
Montenegro 23 642
average of the output per capita and population data of 1984 and 2004.32 To make our data
comparable to the ones of Europe, GDP per capita is expressed relative to the EU-25. As can
be seen in Table 5, differences across republics were substantial, especially in the case of
Slovenia, which had a GDP per capita 165% higher than the Yugoslav average. Lastly, data
on income distribution come, as in our exercise on Europe, from the World Income Inequality
Database v.2.0a. For lack of data for individual republics, we take the year closest to 1990
for Yugoslavia, and use the same income distribution for all six republics.
5.2 The dynamics of breakup
We now use the calibrated parameter values of α, β and δ to see whether the theoretical model
can account for the breakup of Yugoslavia. While we have assigned exact values to α and
β, recall that there is a range δ ∈ [0.0284, 0.147] consistent with Europe being stable. High
values within that range correspond to agents attaching little weight to cultural heterogeneity,
whereas low values within that range imply agents care a lot about cultural differences. In
light of what actually happened in Yugoslavia, we allow for unilateral secessions, and thus
take ULS-stability to be the relevant stability concept. That is, it is enough for a majority in
a given republic to be in favor of independence for the republic to break away. Furthermore,
we assume that the set of all possible partitions excludes Serbia from unilaterally seceding.
This reflects Serbia being the hegemon.33
We represent the incentives to secede by the monetary gains (equivalent variation) from
leaving the union.34 To do so, we determine the “income tax on secession”, t (I, C), that
renders the median agent of the seceding republic, I , indifferent between breaking away
or remaining part of the union of republics that have not yet seceded, C .35 If, say, a 10%
“secession tax” is needed to convince a republic to stay within the union, then the relative
monetary gain from secession is approximately 10%. To determine t (I, C) for each region
32 Though not in the model, another reason for taking the average of 1984 and 2004 would be if agents were
forward-looking and took into account how secession changes future output per capita.
33 This captures the idea that Serbia, by being the dominating center, derived enough of its income per capita
from being the center, so that it would be unwilling to secede. Since our theoretical model does not allow for a
region’s income per capita to change with secession, we simply assume that Serbia never secedes unilaterally.
34 The main results in this section go through if we represent the incentives to secede by welfare gains instead
of by monetary gains.
35 The income tax on secession (t) is the same as minus the income subsidy needed to keep regions within
the union (what we called r in the case of the European Union).
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Table 6 Relative monetary gain from breakup (δ = 0.147)
Monetary gains from breakup
Low weight on cultural heterogeneity
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3
Slovenia 0.02
Croatia −0.012 0.011
Bosnia −0.242 −0.196 −0.120
Macedonia −0.326 −0.278 −0.201
Montenegro −0.463 −0.423 −0.364
Table 7 Relative monetary gain from breakup (δ = 0.0284)
Monetary gains from breakup
High weight on cultural heterogeneity
Round 1 Round 2 Round 3 Round 4 Round 5
Croatia 0.085
Slovenia 0.063 0.079
Bosnia 0.013 0.059 0.117
Macedonia −0.056 −0.009 0.049 0.10
Montenegro −0.244 −0.211 −0.164 −0.121 −0.096
I that is part of union C we solve for t (I, C) in the following equation:
ym(I )(1 − t (I, C))(1 − τ(I )) + α(τ(I )Y (I )(1 − t (I, C)))β (19)
= ym(I )(1 − τ(C)) + α(Z(I,C)τ (C)Y (C))β
where the optimal tax rate of the median income agent of region I , τ(I ), is calculated for the
after “secession tax” income levels.
Table 6 reports the relative monetary gains of unilateral secession, as measured by t (I, C),
experienced by each republic. A positive number indicates that the median agent of a given
region is better off seceding than remaining within the union. By setting δ to its highest value
within the calibrated range [0.0284, 0.147], we are assuming that little weight is attached
to cultural heterogeneity. The first column (Round 1) shows that when all of Yugoslavia is
united, only Slovenia has an incentive to secede. However, once Slovenia quits the union, the
second column (Round 2) shows that Croatia follows suit, as it no longer gains from staying
within the now smaller union, composed of Yugoslavia minus Slovenia. Once Slovenia and
Croatia have left, no other republic has an incentive to secede, as reflected by the negative
numbers in the third column (Round 3). However, if agents give more weight to cultural
distances, the disintegration does not stop there. This can be seen in Table 7, which does
the same exercise, but now sets δ to its lowest possible value within the calibrated range
[0.0284, 0.147]. As expected, this increases the incentive to secede. The order of secession
is now: Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Macedonia. Compared to the first exercise reported
in Table 6, because cultural differences now weigh more, Bosnia and Macedonia also break
away. Once those four republics have seceded, the model predicts a ULS-stable union between
Serbia and Montenegro.
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No matter which δ we use within the calibrated range [0.0284, 0.147], Slovenia and Croa-
tia always secede. Recall that after the dissolution of the all-Yugoslav Communist Party in
1990 these were the only two republics pushing for more devolution. When enough weight is
attached to cultural heterogeneity, Bosnia and Macedonia also break away. The only repub-
lic that never wants to leave is Montenegro. These predictions are broadly consistent with
historical events. The four republics that possibly secede according to the model—Slovenia,
Croatia, Bosnia and Macedonia —all did so between 1991 and 1992. Although Montenegro
eventually also declared independence from Serbia, this happened 15 years later, in 2006,
after a relatively small majority voted in favor of self-determination. The model also does
well in matching the order of disintegration, with the exception that it predicts Bosnia seced-
ing before Macedonia, whereas in reality it happened the other way around. This discrepancy
may be related to the existence of Serbian enclaves in Bosnia, which made its independence
more difficult than that of Macedonia.36
To analyze the robustness of the model’s predictions, we carry out a number of additional
experiments. In the benchmark experiment of Tables 6 and 7 the measure of GDP per capita
is the average of 1984 and 2004. Although we focused on this average to avoid possible
issues with the gross social product measure of 1984, it may nonetheless be informative
to see how our results change if we redo our exercise with the 1984 data. When doing so,
we find that if we attach a high weight to cultural heterogeneity (δ = 0.0284), the results
are virtually unchanged, compared to the benchmark: all republics, with the exception of
Montenegro, secede. The only difference is that Croatia and Bosnia now break away before
Slovenia. As we will see throughout the rest of this section, the order of Slovenia and Croatia
often gets reversed. This is not surprising, given that both republics declared independence
on the very same day, June 25, 1991. Continuing with the data of 1984, if we attach a low
weight to cultural heterogeneity (δ = 0.147), no republic wants to unilaterally secede, so
that Yugoslavia remains united. The weaker incentives for the rich republics to secede reflect
the smaller differences between poor and rich republics in the 1984 data, compared to the
2004 data. If we use the data for 2004, the results are the same as in the benchmark case of
Tables 6 and 7: we get complete disintegration (with the exception of Montenegro) if cultural
heterogeneity gets a high weight, whereas only Slovenia and Croatia break away if cultural
heterogeneity gets a low weight.
The overall picture that emerges from these experiments is that the disintegration of
Yugoslavia was a close call. Whether all of Yugoslavia was bound to break up, whether only
Slovenia and Croatia were likely to leave, or even whether there was a possibility of the union
staying together, essentially depends on how much weight is attached to cultural distances.
This is a reasonable outcome: if under all possible parameter values the model were to predict
the break-up of Yugoslavia, then one could wonder why it did not happen earlier, or how the
country came into being in the first place.37
Although the breakup of Yugoslavia may have been a close call, our results clearly indicate
that Yugoslavia was more unstable than the rest of Europe. Indeed, for the range of parameter
values for which the model predicts the disintegration of Yugoslavia, the rest of Europe is
36 In fact, in 2009 tensions have resurfaced in Bosnia, with Bosnian Serb leaders threatening to secede from
the fragile Bosnian federation.
37 It is important to remember that Yugoslavia was not an accident of history. The country’s foundation was
laid by the Corfu Declaration in 1917 signed by Serbs, Croats and Slovenes. Its preamble stated that Serbs,
Croats and Slovenes were “the same by blood, by language, by the feelings of their unity, by the continuity
and integrity of the territory…” Consistent with what we said before, cultural differences were not that huge,
and depending on the weight given to them, the model predicts Yugoslavia surviving as a union or breaking
apart.
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stable. That is, compared to, say, the Basque Country and Scotland, two of Europe’s regions
where the demands for self-determination are greatest, Slovenia and Croatia had a greater
incentive to secede. If any nation in Europe was unstable, it was Yugoslavia.38 This finding
holds up when we apply the same stability ULS-stability concept to both Yugoslavia and the
rest of Europe. In other words, if we allow for unilateral secession, Slovenia and Croatia are
more keen on breaking away than either the Basque Country or Scotland.
Another relevant question is what was the role of culture and what was the role of eco-
nomics in Yugoslavia’s breakup. After all, it has often been argued that cultural distances
between the different Yugoslav republics were not particularly great. Our matrix of genetic
distances between the different republics largely subscribes to this view: the average dis-
tance of 33 is similar to the distance between Scotland and England or between Belgium and
France. However, the fact that these cultural distances are relatively small does not imply
that they do not matter. To see this, we run a counterfactual experiment by assuming that
Yugoslavia was culturally completely homogeneous. In that case we find that all republics
want to remain within the union. Cultural differences, though small, were essential for the
country’s disintegration. Economic differences, though large, were not enough to cause the
breakup of Yugoslavia.
However, the order of disintegration as predicted by the model is driven by economics.
The first two republics to leave, Slovenia and Croatia, were, respectively, the richest republic
and the largest republic, whereas the republic that never wants to leave according to the
model, Montenegro, is very small, with a population of just over half a million. Although
some republics were culturally more distant than others, this does not matter in determining
the order of breakup. If we re-do our experiments setting all distances between all republics
equal to the average distance of 33, all results go through. In fact, if we set a slightly higher
number of 50 or a slightly lower number of 25, the order of incentives for secession remains
largely unchanged. Given that some of the distances in our matrix were based on a limited
number of genes, and are thus less reliable, this is reassuring because it suggests that the
results do not depend on the exact distances, but rather on the average order of magnitude.
As a final test for the robustness of our results, we ask whether a republic’s decision to
secede, when it does, is a dominant strategy. To give an example, consider ‘round 3’ in Table
7, which predicts that Bosnia leaves the union of Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Montenegro.
To see whether Bosnia’s decision is a dominant strategy, we ask whether Bosnia would still
want to secede from any possible partition of Serbia, Macedonia, Bosnia and Montenegro.39
The answer is ‘yes’. More generally, it turns out that only allowing for secession when it is
a dominant strategy does not change any of the results.
6 Concluding remarks
This paper has proposed a theory where larger countries benefit from scale economies in the
provision of public goods but suffer from greater cultural heterogeneity. It has then empirically
and quantitatively explored the theory by calibrating the model to Europe. It has identified
the ‘weak links’ in the current European map by determining which regions are most likely to
secede and which countries are most likely to unite. As a first application, we have computed
the predicted gains (and losses) from European Union membership. As a second application,
we have analyzed whether the model can account for the breakup of Yugoslavia. The model
38 This statement is limited to the countries and regions analyzed in Sect. 4, which do not include, amongst
others, the Czech Republic and Slovakia.
39 As before, we assume that Serbia never secedes.
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not only shows that Yugoslavia was more unstable than the other European countries, it also
generates an order of disintegration that closely matches the historical record of the country’s
breakup.
This paper is the first to quantitatively analyze the stability of nations by exploring the
tradeoff between cultural heterogeneity and scale economies. Though the model is simple and
stylized, the possibility of making quantitative predictions within a structural model opens
up a set of new possibilities. To give just one example: in recent years there has been much
interest in the stability of Iraq. While understanding this issue obviously requires in-depth
knowledge of Iraq that goes much beyond the simplicity of this framework, being able to make
quantitative predictions based on a calibrated model should be a useful input into this debate.
To make such quantitative models richer, we see at least three main areas that would ben-
efit from future research. First, integration and cooperation between regions and countries
may take many different forms. Regions may have high degrees of autonomy, without fully
seceding. Countries may closely cooperate, without fully uniting. By incorporating those
possibilities into the theoretical framework, one could empirically study the degree of decen-
tralization and cooperation. Second, large coalitions, such as the present-day European Union,
started off much smaller. Since there is likely to be path-dependence in coalition formation,
better understanding these dynamics is important. Third, map redrawing may have effects
that go beyond tax rates and public goods. For example, central (capital) regions may not
want to see peripheral regions go, because much of their wealth stems from being the center.
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Appendix A: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1 Let vm(I, C) be the value of the indirect utility of the median income
agent in I when the tax rate in C is given by τ(C). For every region I ∈ N and partition
π ∈  denote by C I (π) the country in π that contains I . For every partition π ∈  denote
R(π) =
∑
I∈N
vm(I, C I (π)).
We say that π is a median-efficient partition if and only if
R(π) = max
π ′∈
R(π ′).
Since  is a finite set, there exists a median-efficient partition π∗. Let us show that π∗ is
L RM R-stable. If not, then there is a partition π ′ such that the median agent in every region
affected by the map redrawing from π∗ to π ′, would be strictly better off at π ′. Since in
regions that are not affected by such map redrawing there is no change in utility, we have
R(π ′) > R(π∗), a contradiction to the median-efficiency of π∗. unionsq
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Table 9 Cultural distances (WVS), max distance = 100
Aut Fra Ger Bel Den Net Eng Ire Swi Gre Ita Por Spa Fin
Austria 0
France 28 0
Germany 19 27 0
Belgium 20 16 23 0
Denmark 34 26 31 27 0
Netherlands 30 25 27 21 26 0
England 25 22 25 20 27 22 0
Ireland 31 32 38 26 36 31 22 0
Sweden 30 26 27 26 22 23 24 34 0
Greece 27 32 32 29 41 38 28 32 37 0
Italy 23 24 28 22 34 29 22 23 32 24 0
Portugal 23 29 28 25 41 37 27 28 38 28 18 0
Spain 24 22 26 19 32 26 22 24 32 30 19 21 0
Finland 27 34 27 30 34 31 26 37 28 30 32 32 32 0
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